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Using Election Forecasts to Understand 
the Potential Influence of Campaigns, 
Media, and the Law in U.S. Presidential 
Elections 
PETER K. ENNS* & JULIUS LAGODNY** 
How do campaigns, media, and voting laws influence the 
outcome of U.S. Presidential elections? Political scientists 
often argue that these factors influence outcomes much less 
than commonly thought. To illustrate this argument, we 
show that we can predict the presidential vote in each state 
with a high degree of accuracy. Specifically, between 2004 
and 2016, we correctly predict 94% of all state presidential 
vote outcomes. Our predictions are based on a forecasting 
model of the Electoral College, based primarily on each 
state’s approval rating of the incumbent president (using al-
most 90,000 survey responses from June and July of election 
years), current economic conditions in each state, and state 
votes in the previous election. We use these forecasts to help 
establish the upper bounds of campaign and media effects. 
We argue that identifying the limits of these effects is a crit-
ical step when trying to estimate their impact. We also show 
how our forecasts can be used to test the aggregate effects 
of election-related laws, such as Florida’s Amendment 4—
which enfranchised hundreds of thousands of Floridians 
who previously could not vote due to felony convictions—
 
 * Peter K. Enns is professor of Government at Cornell University, co-direc-
tor of the Cornell Center for Social Sciences, and executive director of the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research. Professor Enns may be reached via email at 
peterenns@cornell.edu.  
 ** Julius Lagodny is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at 
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and voter ID laws, whose effects are notoriously difficult to 
study. We have made our data publicly available to facilitate 
further research on these topics. 
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U.S. presidential campaigns spend billions of dollars, run thou-
sands of television advertisements, and develop highly sophisticated 
social media and micro-targeting campaigns.1 Seeking any possible 
 
 1 See Christopher Ingraham, Somebody Just Put a Price Tag on the 2016 
Election. It’s a Doozy., WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put
-a-price-tag-on-the-2016-election-its-a-doozy/ (discussing “staggering” election 
costs); Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Every Presidential Candidate’s TV Ad Buys, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:39 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/
2020-campaign-ads/ (discussing TV advertisements); Dawn C. Nunziato, The 
Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521-22 (2019) (dis-
cussing social media in elections); DIANA OWEN, New Media and Political Cam-
paigns, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 823, 823-26 
(Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2017) (discussing social media and 
micro-targeting in elections); Michael Beckel, Team Clinton Sponsored 75 Per-
cent of TV Ads in 2016 Presidential Race, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 16, 
2016, 5:35 pm ET), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/team-clinton-sponsored-
75-percent-of-tv-ads-in-2016-presidential-race/ (highlighting that, of 500,000 TV 
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competitive edge, these campaigns carefully navigate and respond 
to shifting campaign finance and election laws and to the rapidly 
changing media and information environment.2 As Holly Ann Gar-
nett and Toby S. James conclude, “Elections are entering a new dig-
ital era in which there are new opportunities and threats for the con-
duct and contestation of elections.”3 With good reason, “What 
Swings the Vote: The Influence of the U.S. Legal System and the 
Media on Presidential Elections” was the focus of the University of 
Miami Law Review’s 2020 Symposium.4 
To better understand the potential influence of campaigns, me-
dia, and the legal system, we focus on understanding the limits of 
these effects. Although pundits and media often portray each aspect 
of the campaign—the conventions, debates, speeches, and even 
speaking gaffes—as having massive potential influence on voters 
and the election outcome, we build on political science research that 
shows presidential campaigns typically produce limited effects on 
election outcomes.5 The influence of the media and political cam-
paigns is smaller than one would expect despite the vast amounts of 
time, money, and strategy involved.6 
 
advertisements that aired in the 2016 presidential election, “Team Hilary Clinton 
accounted for 75 percent of them”). 
 2 See Janna Anderson & Lee Raine, Theme 4: The Information Environment 
Will Improve, Because People Will Adjust and Make Things Better, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/theme-4-
the-information-environment-will-improve-because-people-will-adjust-and-
make-things-better/; see, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 
185, 191–93 (2014); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–36, 556–57 
(2013); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 317–22, 371–72 
(2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1976); N.C State Conf. of the NAACP 
v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 3 Holly Ann Garnett & Toby S. James, Cyber Elections in the Digital Age: 
Threats and Opportunities of Technology for Electoral Integrity, 19 ELECTION L. 
J. 111, 123 (2020). 
 4 2020 Symposium, UNIV. MIA. L. REV., https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/
2020-symposium/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 5 See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT 94 (2004); Andrew Gelman & 
Gary King, Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable 
When Votes Are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409, 409 (1993); ROBERT 
S. ERIKSON & CHRISTOPHER WLEZIEN, THE TIMELINE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS 5 (2012). 
 6 See STIMSON, supra note 5, at 93–94. 
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This analysis proceeds in three steps. Part I offers an overview 
of the political science literature on presidential campaign effects. 
This literature, which shows that campaign effects are often much 
more muted than typically thought,7 offers an important foundation 
for understanding the potential influence, or lack thereof, of presi-
dential campaigns. With this background, Part II presents a model 
we developed to forecast how each state votes in U.S. presidential 
elections.8 This model, which is based primarily on economic con-
ditions and presidential approval ratings in each state in June and 
July of election years, consistently predicts the national popular 
vote—and Electoral College outcomes—with a high degree of ac-
curacy.9 The ability to predict state level outcomes sheds important 
light on the potential influence of campaigns. After all, if we can 
predict the outcome with a high degree of accuracy, the opportunity 
to influence votes must be limited. Part III discusses the implications 
of these findings for studying campaign effects and opportunities for 
future research. In particular, we show how the data we use in our 
analysis, which we have made publicly available, can be extended 
to evaluate the effects of various legal constraints on elections, such 
as felon disenfranchisement and voter registration laws.10 
I. EXISTING EVIDENCE OF LIMITED PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
EFFECTS 
Political scientists have long noted that a few fundamental vari-
ables, such as economic conditions and presidential approval rat-
ings, predict the final vote share of U.S. presidential elections with 
 
 7 See id. at 94. 
 8 See Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral Col-
lege Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State Economy Model, 54 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 81, 81–85 (2021) [hereinafter Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 
Electoral College Winner]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Peter Enns & Julius Lagodny, Replication Data for: Forecasting the 2020 
Electoral College Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State Economy 
Model, HARV. DATAVERSE (Aug. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Enns & Lagodny, Repli-
cation Data], https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ADMBN9. 
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a high degree of accuracy well in advance of the election.11 If the 
final vote is predictable months in advance,12 it seems unlikely that 
the campaign has substantial influence. To see why, consider some-
one who takes a practice test months before the actual exam. Then, 
following the practice test, this person studies every day until the 
actual exam. If we wanted to understand the effect of studying, we 
would look at the difference in scores between the practice test and 
the actual test. If the person did much better on the actual test than 
the practice test, we would have evidence consistent with the hy-
pothesis that studying had a large positive impact on the exam. By 
contrast, if the scores were identical, we would have evidence that 
studying was not effective; it did not change the outcome. If the 
practice exam perfectly predicts the actual exam score (because they 
are the same), by definition, what came between the practice exam 
and actual exam did not change the result.13 The same intuition ap-
plies to election forecasts.14 It is hard to imagine that a campaign 
influenced many voters if knowing the fundamental variables 
months in advance can predict what percentage of the vote the Dem-
ocratic and Republican candidates will receive on Election Day. 
Theoretically, it is possible that the campaign gets an equal num-
ber of Democratic voters and Republican voters to switch their po-
sitions, implying large but completely offsetting effects of cam-
paigning. In such a situation, we would still correctly predict the 
outcome, but we would not grasp the underlying vote switching. 
However, we know from panel data where the same respondents are 
interviewed in different elections that this type of vote switching 
 
 11 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1; STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, FORECASTING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
54–55 (1983); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate 
Were They?, 18 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 53, 56–57 (1985). 
 12 Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 409. 
 13 Of course, someone could argue that the person might have forgotten in-
formation and, therefore, would have performed worse had they not studied every 
day between the practice and actual exam. But we are comfortable asserting that 
the exertion of extreme effort, whether studying every day for a final or spending 
vast amounts of money on a campaign, is designed to change the outcome in a 
positive direction and the absence of this change implies minimal effects. 
 14 See id. 
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from election to election is very rare.15 Not surprisingly, when the 
same respondents are interviewed during an election, switching 
sides within an election campaign is also rare.16 
Based on the predictability of elections, Andrew Gelman and 
Gary King conclude that the primary effect of campaigns is getting 
voters to connect their vote choice to the above mentioned funda-
mentals.17 They argue that the reason vote intentions in surveys (of-
ten referred to as the “horse race polls”)18 fluctuate throughout the 
campaign, though the election is predictable, is because early in the 
campaign some voters have not yet connected their vote intentions 
to the fundamentals.19 As Election Day approaches, more and more 
of the electorate bases their vote intentions on the fundamentals, 
leading national surveys in the final week or so of the election to 
correspond very closely with the actual outcome.20 
 
 15 See Tess Eyrich, What Was Behind ‘Vote-Switching’ in the 2016 Election?, 
UC RIVERSIDE NEWS (July 23, 2019), https://news.ucr.edu/articles/2019/
07/23/what-was-behind-vote-switching-2016-election; Diana C. Mutz & Sam 
Wolken, Vote Switching from 2016 to 2020, ELECTION ANALYSIS, 
https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-2-voters/vote-switch-
ing-from-2016-to-2020/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 16 See Alexander Coppock et al., The Small Effects of Political Advertising 
Are Small Regardless of Context, Message, Sender, or Receiver: Evidence from 
59 Real-Time Randomized Experiments, 6 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 5 (2020); GABRIEL 
S. LENZ, FOLLOW THE LEADER? HOW VOTERS RESPOND TO POLITICIANS’ 
POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE 185–87, 196 (2012); Peter K. Enns & Ashley Jar-
dina, Complicating the Role of Racial Attitudes and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, PUB. OP. Q. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 17) (on file with authors).  
 17 See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 449; PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., 
THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN 73 (2d ed. 1948) (emphasizing “activation” of latent predispositions 
during campaigns); see also ERIKSON & WLEZIEN, supra note 5, at 2 (referring to 
“crystallization of voter preferences over [a] campaign timeline.”). 
 18 Clifford Young, Cliff’s Take: Beware of Horse Race Polls, IPSOS (Aug. 
14, 2020), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/cliffs-take-beware-horse-race-polls. 
 19 See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419, 436 (analyzing more “funda-
mental” variables, such as partisanship and demographic variables, than those re-
lated to economic conditions and presidential approval). 
 20 Id. Although surveys are not always viewed by the public as accurate, the 
record of high-quality national surveys prior to the election is incredibly strong. 
Miller & Tomoko Mitamura, Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 
62, 62 (2003); Claudia Deane et al., A Field Guide to Polling: Election 2020 
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While it is true that the fundamentals correlate more strongly 
with vote intentions as the election approaches, Peter K. Enns and 
Brian Richman provide substantial evidence that much of this shift 
is not a result of campaign effects or voter learning.21 They argue 
that most voters, even those who are not normally attuned to politics, 
do not need a campaign to know how to connect fundamental con-
siderations like economic conditions, approval of the incumbent 
president, their partisan identity, or their race to whether to vote for 
the Republican or Democratic candidate.22 Enns and Richman argue 
that well in advance of the election, many survey respondents 
simply do not treat the survey question, which asks how they would 
vote if the election was held today, like the actual vote choice, which 
is still months or weeks away.23 
To understand their logic, imagine if someone asked what res-
taurant you wanted to go to three months from today. Three months 
probably seems like a long way off, so considerations like what res-
taurant seems new, exciting, or even extravagant might guide your 
response (perhaps you just read a restaurant review for a five-star 
restaurant or heard a recommendation from a friend with expensive 
tastes). Now imagine someone asked you what restaurant you 
wanted to go to tonight. More fundamental considerations like cost, 
location, and convenience would likely influence your response. In 
the first scenario, when the choice was three months away, it was 
not that you did not know how much money you had for dinner or 
that convenience mattered. It is just that when a choice feels like it 
 
Edition, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/meth-
ods/2019/11/19/a-field-guide-to-polling-election-2020-edition/#fn-585-1; Max 
Witynski, Should You Trust the 2020 Election Polls? Yes, but…, UNIV. CHI. NEWS 
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://news.uchicago.edu/story/should-you-trust-2020-election-
polls-yes. For example, in 2016, ten days before the election, ABC News reported 
survey results that were within less than 1% of the outcome. See Gary Langer, 
Shift in the Electorate’s Makeup Tightens the Presidential Contest (Poll), ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/shift-electorates-
makeup-tightens-presidentialcontest-poll/story?id=43142198; see also Will Jen-
nings & Christopher Wlezien, Election Polling Errors Across Time and Space, 2 
NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 276, 278 (2018). 
 21 Peter K. Enns & Brian Richman, Presidential Campaigns and the Funda-
mentals Reconsidered, 75 J. POL. 803, 815–17 (2013); see Gelman & King, supra 
note 5, at 419, 436. 
 22 See Enns & Richman, supra note 21, at 804–07. 
 23 See id. at 808, 816. 
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is a long way away, different considerations often come to mind. As 
the choice gets closer, fundamental considerations are more likely 
to be considered.24 Enns and Richman argue the same process oc-
curs during an election campaign.25 Early in the campaign, some 
survey respondents might express their vote intention based on the 
most recent headline, advertisement, or social media post they 
saw.26 However, as the election gets closer, survey respondents in-
creasingly treat the survey question about who they would vote for 
like the actual election choice, relying on more fundamental consid-
erations like partisanship, presidential approval, and economic con-
ditions.27 As a result, we observe a closer alignment between the 
fundamentals and reported vote intentions.28 In other words, it is 
proximity to the election, not learning from the campaign, that mat-
ters.29 
This is not to say that U.S. presidential campaigns have no in-
fluence. Candidates and campaigns can make certain issues more 
salient to voters by emphasizing them more during the campaign,30 
and these efforts can be heightened by emotional appeals.31 In some 
cases, voters may be persuaded to support a different candidate,32 
although this tends to be difficult and rare.33 Negative campaigning 
can also influence the political environment by reducing the public’s 
 
 24 See id. at 806. 
 25 See id. at 804, 807. 
 26 See id. at 805–06, 816. 
 27 See id. at 805–06. 
 28 See id. at 806, 816. 
 29 See id. at 815–17. This conclusion aligns with evidence that when voters 
learn of candidates’ policy positions, voters are more likely to adopt the positions 
of their preferred candidate, not update which candidate they support. See LENZ , 
supra note 16, at 185, 196, 206–13. 
 30 See LYNN VAVRECK, THE MESSAGE MATTERS: THE ECONOMY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 14 (2009). 
 31 See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW 
EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK 111 (2006); GEORGE E. MARCUS 
ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 124 (2000). 
 32 See D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE 
VOTER: WEDGE ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 68–69 (2008) (e-book); 
Gregory A. Huber & Kevin Arceneaux, Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Pres-
idential Advertising, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 957, 976 (2007). 
 33 Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects 
of Political Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Ex-
periments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 163 (2018). 
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sense of “political efficacy” and “trust in government.”34 Campaigns 
can also have positive effects on voter turnout,35 although there is 
also debate in political science about how much increased turnout 
would alter typical presidential elections.36 In other words, presiden-
tial campaigns matter but much less than often thought.37 Indeed, in 
a series of fifty-nine real-time experiments over eight months lead-
ing up to the 2016 election, Alexander Coppock, Seth J. Hill, and 
Lynn Vavreck found only very small average effects of political ad-
vertising on voting behavior or even candidate likability.38 
Of course, it is important to recognize that in a close election 
anything could tip the final outcome.39 Donald Trump’s Electoral 
College victory in 2016 came down to less than 80,000 votes across 
three states.40 George W. Bush’s victory in 2000 came down to just 
537 votes in Florida.41 As Barry Richard chronicled in his 2020 
Symposium Keynote Address, the law certainly mattered for the 
 
 34 Richard R. Lau et al., The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A 
Meta‐Analytic Reassessment, 69 J. POL. 1176, 1186 (2007). 
 35 See Ryan D. Enos & Anthony Fowler, Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale 
Campaigns on Voter Turnout, 8 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 1, 15–16 (2016). 
However, get-out-the-vote (“GOTV”) efforts may widen turnout disparities by 
mobilizing those more likely to vote more than underrepresented citizens who are 
less likely to vote. Ryan D. Enos et al., Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV 
Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate, 76 J. POL. 273, 286 (2014). 
 36 See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Con-
straints on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American 
Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAV. 179, 196 (1995). 
 37 See J. Alexander Branham & Christopher Wlezien, Do Election Cam-
paigns Matter? A Comparative Perspective and Overview, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL PERSUASION 184, 196 (Elizabeth Suhay et al. eds., 
2019); THOMAS M. HOLBROOK, DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER? 153 (1996). 
 38 See Coppock et al., supra note 16, at 5. 
 39 See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Campaigns Influence Election 
Outcomes Less Than You Think, 369 SCI. MAG. 1181, 1181 (2020). 
 40 Philip Bump, Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in 
Three States, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:38 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks
-to-80000-people-in-three-states/. 
 41 See David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results – Florida, 
DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Nov. 1, 2020, 1:41 PM), 
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/. 
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2000 election outcome in Florida and, therefore, nationally.42 Ballot 
design and felon disenfranchisement also clearly influenced many 
more than 537 votes in Florida.43 Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognize that the potential influence of campaigns is much less than 
often thought.44 To offer further insight into understanding the po-
tential influence, or lack thereof, of campaigns, media, and the law 
in U.S. presidential elections, the following section presents a sta-
tistical model to forecast the presidential vote in each state, includ-
ing Washington, D.C., more than three months prior to the election. 
This model helps establish the upper bounds on campaign and media 
influence and offers a path for further understanding the extent to 
which particular laws influence presidential election outcomes. 
II. A NEW FORECAST MODEL OF STATE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OUTCOMES 
As noted above, political scientists often emphasize the predict-
ability of U.S. presidential elections.45 But this research focuses pri-
marily on the predictability of the national popular vote.46 To better 
 
 42 Barry Richard, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig P.A., Keynote Address at 
the 2020 University of Miami Law Review Symposium: What Swings the Vote 
(Feb. 7, 2020). 
 43 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE 
NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 16, 28–29 (2012). Of course, given the closeness of 
the 2000 election, myriad other factors mattered, too; one example is Vice Presi-
dent Gore’s advertising strategy may have cost him his home state of Tennessee. 
See id.; DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270 149–50 (2006). 
 44 See Mike Cummings, Political Ads Have Little Persuasive Power, YALE 
NEWS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://news.yale.edu/2020/09/02/political-ads-have-little-
persuasive-power. 
 45 Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 410–11, 448–49. 
 46 See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419. See infra note 74 and ac-
companying text for state-level models and how they differ from our approach.; 
Forecasting the US Elections, ECONOMIST, https://projects.economist.com/us-
2020-forecast/president (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (forecast by Andrew Gelman 
and Merlin Heidemanns for 2020 election predicting outcome of Electoral Col-
lege in 2020 election); How the Economist Presidential Forecast Works, 
ECONOMIST, https://projects.economist.com/us-2020-forecast/president/how-this
-works (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (“The first step in our model is to generate a 
prediction for the national popular vote on election day. We use two main sources 
of information: national polls and ‘fundamentals’, the term in political science for 
structural factors that influence voter decisions.”). 
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understand the scope and limits of potential campaign effects, we 
present a model we developed to forecast how each state votes in 
U.S. presidential elections.47 Since the Electoral College, and not the 
popular vote, decides who will become the next president, predict-
ing state-level outcomes circumvents this American peculiarity.48 
This way, our model also aligns more closely with strategies of po-
litical campaigns that mostly concentrate their efforts on a handful 
of battle or swings states instead of the whole country.49 
A. How Does Our Forecast Model Work? 
This forecast model includes multiple variables based on theo-
retical and empirical considerations and our full analysis includes 
data back to 1980.50 However, to illustrate the logic of our forecast, 
we first consider a single variable (presidential approval) from a sin-
gle year.51 In Figure 1, the top panel reports each state’s presidential 
approval rating during June and July 2012 on the x-axis.52 Higher 
values correspond with more support for the incumbent president. 
Presidential approval ranges from -20 to 30 because, as we explain 
in the next Part, we adjust the standard approval rating so values 
below zero imply an incumbent disadvantage and values above zero 
 
 47 Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, Online Supplementary Appendix: Fore-
casting the 2020 Electoral College Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State 
Economy Model, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS Online A-1, Online A-2 (2020) [herein-
after Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix], https://static.cambridge.org/
content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:article:S1049096520001407/resource/name/
S1049096520001407sup001.pdf; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Elec-
toral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1. 
 48 SHAW, supra note 43, at 125. 
 49 See Swing States Keep Campaigns Guessing, SHAREAMERICA (Oct. 29, 
2020), https://share.america.gov/swing-states-keep-campaigns-guessing/; Robert 
Alexander, The Battle to be the President of the Swing States of America, CNN 
(Oct. 14, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/opinions/president-
swing-states-of-america-opinion-alexander/index.html; Tamara Keith, Biden, 
Trump Focus on Swing States as November’s Election Nears, NPR (Oct. 19, 2020, 
7:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/19/925278573/biden-trump-focus-on-
swing-states-as-novembers-election-nears. 
 50 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1. 
 51 See infra Figure 1. 
 52 Id. 
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imply an incumbent advantage.53 On the y-axis, we graph the per-
centage of the two-party Democratic vote share in 2012 for each 
state.54 In 2012, the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, was the 
incumbent President.55 We see that Utah had the lowest approval 
rating of and the lowest vote support for President Obama.56 Wash-
ington, D.C., by contrast, had the highest approval rating and the 
highest percentage of votes for President Obama.57 The other states 
(not labeled) are scattered around the linear regression line, which 
represents the best fitting line to the data (e.g., the line that mini-
mizes the distance between the dots and a linear line through the 
dots).58 Furthermore, the slope of the line is positive, relatively 
steep, and the values of the states are very close to the best fitting 
line.59 These patterns indicate a strong and positive relationship be-
tween presidential approval and vote choice in 2012. 
 
 53 See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online 
A-2. 
 54 Infra Figure 1. The two-party Democratic vote share is estimated as fol-
lows: % Democrats / (% Democrats + % Republicans) in each state. 
 55 See David Jackson, Obama’s Biggest Advantage: Incumbency, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 20, 2012, 9:10 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/the-
oval/2012/10/20/barack-obama-incumbent-mitt-romney-election-2012-history/
1646047/; Ford O’Connell, Barack Obama Won the Debate Because of Incum-
bent Advantage, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/debate-
club/who-won-the-obama-romney-foreign-policy-debate/barack-obama-won-
the-debate-because-of-incumbent-advantage. 
 56 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state ap-
proval data, see Jeffrey M. Jones, Thirteen States and D.C. Give Obama Majority 
Approval, GALLUP (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Jones, Thirteen States and D.C. 
Give Obama Majority Approval], https://news.gallup.com/poll/156389/thirteen-
states-give-obama-majority-approval.aspx (“His highest ratings by state were in 
Hawaii (63%) and Rhode Island (58%), in addition to the 83% approval from 
District of Columbia residents. In 16 states, his approval rating averaged below 
40%, with residents of Utah, Wyoming, and Alaska least approving.”); Live Elec-
tion Results: Utah, 270 TO WIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/Utah (last vis-
ited Dec. 17, 2020); and Figure 1. 
 57 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1 for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state ap-
proval data, see Jones, Thirteen States and D.C. Give Obama Majority Approval, 
supra note 56 and infra Figure 1. 
 58 See infra Figure 1. 
 59 Id. 




Figure 1: A Simplified Illustration of Our Forecast Approach.60 
 
 60 This Figure uses the relationship between presidential approval and state 
vote in 2012 to forecast Wisconsin’s 2016 vote based on presidential approval 
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Still focusing on the top panel, we highlight Wisconsin, which 
had an adjusted approval rating of 1.2 (shown on the x-axis), mean-
ing just above what we would consider no incumbent advantage 
(when adjusted, approval =0).61 On the y-axis, we see that in 2012, 
President Obama received 53.5% of the two-party vote in Wiscon-
sin.62  
Now, focusing on the bottom panel (which repeats the regression 
line and the dot for Wisconsin from the top panel), we use Wiscon-
sin to illustrate how we can use this information to forecast the ex-
pected Democratic vote share in 2016 for Secretary Hillary Clin-
ton.63 In 2016, the adjusted presidential approval rating for President 
Obama from June and July 2016 had dropped to -3.2 (vertical 
dashed line).64 The diagonal line is identical to the top panel and still 
represents the relationship between presidential approval and vote 
choice in 2012 (e.g., the previous election).65 We can now use the 
information about the relationship between presidential approval 
and vote choice in 2012 and the information about presidential ap-
proval in June and July 2016 to predict the November 2016 election 
outcome. Note, this prediction does not use any information after 
July, more than three months before the election. 
First, we need to consider the presidential approval rating in 
June and July 2016, which is lower (e.g., the vertical dashed line is 
to the left of the Wisconsin dot) than in 2012.66 This suggests we 
should expect Secretary Clinton to get a lower vote share than Pres-
ident Obama did in 2012. To determine how much, we follow the 
 
from June–July of 2016. Our actual forecast model uses multiple variables and 
data from all available prior years. Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Elec-
toral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1. 
 61 See supra Figure 1. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, 
supra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state 
approval data, see Wisconsin: Obama Job Approval, HUFFPOST POLLSTER, 
https://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/wisconsin-obama-job-approval (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2021), and see also Presidential Approval Ratings – Barack 
Obama, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presiden-
tial-job-approval.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (illustrating Barak Obama’s ap-
proval ratings through both terms in office). 
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arrow down to the regression line. The point at which Wisconsin’s 
2016 approval rating67 (-3.2, vertical dashed line) intersects with the 
regression line from 2012 represents our 2016 prediction for Wis-
consin.68 In this simple model, 100 days before the election, we 
would predict that Secretary Clinton would receive 45.4% of the 
two-party vote; she ended up receiving 49.6%.69 Although this sim-
ple model correctly predicts that Secretary Clinton would lose Wis-
consin,70 our prediction is a notable 4% off. Thus, our actual models 
include additional relevant variables and additional years of prior 
data.71 However, the logic of the forecast model remains the same: 
when including multiple variables, we estimate the relationship be-
tween these variables and vote outcomes in each state in prior 
years.72 We then use these estimated relationships (represented by 
the regression line in Figure 1) and actual variable values through 
July of the next election to predict each state’s presidential vote.73 
We detail our model’s variables below. 
B. Forecast Model Details 
Although national election forecasts are the most common, 
scholars have developed important forecast models of state vote 
 
 67 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state ap-
proval data, see Washington Post SurveyMonkey 50 State Poll, WASH. POST, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3098997/2016-09-01-50-State-Sur-
vey-Trend-for-Release.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); New Marquette Law 
School Poll Finds Clinton, Feingold Leading; Parties Remain Divided, MARQ. 
UNIV. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2016/11/02/mlsp41release/ 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 68 See supra Figure 1. 
 69 WEC Canvass Reporting System, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N., https://elec-
tions.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/Statewide%20Results%20All%20Of-
fices%20%28post-Presidential%20recount%29.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
Based on two-party vote share (% Clinton / (%Clinton+%Trump). Id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3–
A-4. 
 72 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1; supra Figure 1. 
 73 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4–
A-5. 
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outcomes.74 Our approach differs from existing approaches in three 
important ways. First, in contrast to previous state-level election 
forecasts, we measure approval of the incumbent president at the 
state level.75 Prior forecasts, even those forecasting state-level out-
comes, have focused on national-level approval ratings.76 Second, 
we use the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s monthly index 
of coincident economic indicators77 to measure economic conditions 
in each state.78 This index is advantageous in our forecast model be-
cause it combines multiple economic measures and, therefore, in-
corporates multiple aspects of the economy.79 The strength of these 
 
 74 See Michael J. Berry & Kenneth N. Bickers, Forecasting the 2012 Presi-
dential Election with State-Level Economic Indicators, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
669, 670 (2012); Patrick Hummel & David Rothschild, Fundamental Models for 
Forecasting Elections at the State Level, 35 ELECTORAL STUD. 123, 123–24, 129, 
133 (2014); Bruno Jerôme & Véronique Jerôme-Speziari, Forecasting the 2012 
US Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy 
Model, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 663, 664–66 (2012); Bruno Jerôme & Véronique 
Jerôme-Speziari, State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: 
Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, 49 PS: POL. SCI. & 
POL. 680, 682 (2016) [hereinafter State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presi-
dential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory]; 
Carl E. Klarner, State-Level Forecasts of the 2012 Federal and Gubernatorial 
Elections, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 655, 656 (2012); James E. Campbell et al., Fore-
casting the Presidential Vote in the States, 1948-2004, 5 J. POL. MKTG. 33, 38, 
42–43 (2006). 
 75 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2; 
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, 
at 1; see, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419; Forecasting the US Elections, 
supra note 46; How the Economist Presidential Forecast Works, supra note 46. 
 76 See Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 670; Hummel & Rothschild, supra 
note 74, at 123–24, 129, 133; Forecasting the 2012 US Presidential Election: 
Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy Model, supra note 74, at 664–
66; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Econ-
omy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682; Klarner, supra 
note 74, at 656; Campbell et al., supra note 74, at 38, 42–43. 
 77 State Coincident Indexes, FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., https://www.philadel-
phiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/indexes/coincident (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2021); Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, 
supra note 8, at 1. 
 78 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
A-3; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 79 State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77; see Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting 
the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1. 
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two measures leads to a much more parsimonious model, which is 
our third advantage. Where past state-level forecast models range 
between thirteen and nineteen variables,80 our model predicts past 
elections as well or better with just nine variables.81 The parsimony 
of our model highlights how just a few key variables can predict the 
election outcome and avoids overfitting our model, which can make 
predictions worse.82 
Another notable feature of our forecast is that we make it more 
than three months prior to the election, using economic data availa-
ble through June of election year and presidential approval data 
available through June and July of election year.83 Thus, our fore-
casts are made around the time of or before the Republican and 
Democratic nomination conventions,84 prior to the presidential and 
vice-presidential debates,85 and before the onset of the most salient 
campaign activities and media coverage.86 This timing implies that 
if we are able to make accurate predictions, the influence of these 
subsequent activities must be limited, or at least mostly offsetting, 
 
 80 See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74; State-Level Forecasts for the 
2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clin-
ton Victory, supra note 74. 
 81 Infra Figure 2. 
 82 Douglas M. Hawkins, The Problem of Overfitting, J. CHEM. INFO. & 
COMPUT. SCI. 1, 2 (2004). 
 83 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7. 
 84 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. The earliest convention during our period of analysis was the 1980 
Republican National Convention held between July 14 and 17. See Elizabeth 
Drew, 1980: The Republican Convention, NEW YORKER, Aug. 11, 1980, at 38 
(1980). 
 85 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7; 
see Presidential Debates (1960-2020), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guide-
book/presidential-campaigns-debates-and-endorsements-0 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2021). 
 86 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4; 
see 1980 Debates, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.de-
bates.org/debate-history/1980-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1984 Debates, 
COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-his-
tory/1984-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1988 Debates, COMM’N ON 
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1988-debates/ 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1992 Debates, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1992-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
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since by definition, our model does not take them into account and 
only looks at the underlying fundamentals.87 If campaign activities, 
media, and social media were influencing votes and the election out-
come, we would not be able to predict each state’s vote accurately. 
As indicated above, while most political science election fore-
casts include presidential approval,88 a key contribution of our ap-
proach is estimating the percent approving of the president in each 
state.89 Building on our earlier work,90 we use a statistical technique 
called multi-level regression with poststratification (“MRP”) to es-
timate state-level public opinion from national surveys.91 
MRP is a three-step approach that involves estimat-
ing a multilevel model to identify the relationship be-
tween demographic categories and the probability of 
survey response (in this case indicating approval of 
the president’s handling of the job of president), us-
ing these estimates to predict the probability of ap-
proval for each demographic-geographic [category] 
(e.g., African American females, age 30-44, with 
some college education, in Texas [or White males, 
age 65+, with no high school degree in New York]), 
 
 87 See supra Part I; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College 
Winner, supra note 8, at 1. 
 88 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1–2; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at 
Online A-2. 
 89 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 90 See Peter K. Enns & Juliana Koch, Public Opinion in the U.S. States: 1956 
to 2010, 13 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 349, 350 (2013); Peter K. Enns & Juliana Koch, 
State Policy Mood: The Importance of Over-time Dynamics, 15 ST. POL. & POL’Y 
Q. 436, 436–37 (2015); Peter K. Enns et al., Understanding the 2016 US Presi-
dential Polls: The Importance of Hidden Trump Supporters, 8 STAT., POL. & 
POL’Y 41, 51–52 (2017); PETER K. ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE 
UNITED STATES BECAME THE PUNITIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 134–35 
(2016). 
 91 See Andrew Gelman & Thomas C. Little, Poststratification into Many Cat-
egories Using Hierarchical Logistic Regression, 23 SURV. METHODOLOGY 127, 
129–34 (1997); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate 
Public Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 108–10 (2009); Julianna 
Pacheco, Measuring and Evaluating Changes in State Opinion Across Eight Is-
sues, 42 AM. POL. RSCH. 986, 987–1002 (2014). 
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and then using census data to poststratify (i.e., 
weight) the responses to match actual state popula-
tion values. MRP has repeatedly been shown to re-
cover valid state-level measures of public opinion 
from national surveys.92 
Our MRP estimates of state presidential approval use seventy 
surveys with almost 90,000 respondents from June and July of each 
election year.93 We follow past research for national-level approval 
and “subtract a constant [from this value] so that when our approval 
variable equals zero, it is roughly equivalent to having no incumbent 
advantage” after we estimate the percentage of voters in each state 
who approve of the president.94 In a second step, we multiply the 
approval rating by -1 when the incumbent is a Republican because 
our outcome of interest is Democratic vote share.95 
Because presidential election outcomes also reflect economic 
conditions,96 we measure each state’s economic conditions with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s monthly index of coincident 
economic indicators.97 These data begin in January 1979, so 1980 is 
the first election included in the analysis.98 This index uses four sep-
arate economic components, “nonfarm payroll employment, aver-
age hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate . . . , 
and wage and salary disbursements,” to measure current economic 
 
 92 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
Online A-4.; see Gelman & Little, supra note 91, at 129–34; Lax & Phillips, supra 
note 91, at 108–09; Pacheco, supra note 91, at 987–88. 
 93 We accessed the survey data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research at Cornell University (with one survey from Gallup Analytics), as ex-
plained in Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at 
Online A-2–A-4, Online A-10–A-17. 
 94 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2. 
 95 See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 126. 
 96 Id. at 124. 
 97 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1; see State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77. 
 98 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1; see State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77; Beige Book Report: Phil-
adelphia, FED. RSRV. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 14, 1979), https://www.minne-
apolisfed.org/beige-book-reports/1979/1979-11-ph. 
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conditions in each state.99 Similar to Erikson and Wlezien,100 we cal-
culate the cumulative percentage change in coincident indicators 
through June of election year, weighting months closer to the elec-
tion more heavily.101 
The model also includes each state’s past presidential vote, 
measured as the deviation from the national vote in the past elec-
tion,102 home state of the presidential candidate, the home state of 
the presidential candidate in the previous election (to account for the 
return to typical voting levels in that state in the subsequent elec-
tion), and the vice presidential candidate’s home state.103 The fore-
cast model also controls for the percentage of the vote in each state 
that went to influential third-party candidates in the previous elec-
tion and a binary indicator for the formerly Confederate states, cap-
turing their Republican lean during the analysis period.104 
Figure 2 presents the model including all data from 1980 through 
2016.105 Values greater than zero mean that the estimated relation-
ship between the variable and the percentage Democratic vote is 
positive.106 Negative numbers imply a negative relationship.107 All 
variables show the theoretically expected direction.108 The horizon-
tal lines around the point estimates represent the 95% confidence 
interval.109 This is a measure of uncertainty. None of the 95% 
 
 99 State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77. 
 100 See Robert S. Erikson & Christopher Wlezien, Forecasting the Presiden-
tial Vote with Leading Economic Indicators and the Polls, 49 PS: POL. SCI. & 
POL. 669, 669–71 (2016). 
 101 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
A-3. We have calculated the monthly percent change in each state’s coincident 
index, weighting economic changes closer to the election more than changes ear-
lier in the incumbent’s presidency. Id. 
 102 Id. at Online A-7; see Campbell et al., supra note 74, at 36; Hummel & 
Rothschild, supra note 74, at 127 tbl.2. 
 103 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4. 
“[W]e code the state of the Democratic candidate 1, the state of the Republican 
candidate -1, and all other states 0.” Id. 
 104 Id. at Online A-4. 
 105 Id. at Online A-3, Online A-5. 
 106 See infra Figure 2. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. 
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confidence intervals overlap zero, indicating that all variables in the 
model are statistically significant.110 
All variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so the co-
efficients reported in Figure 2 are directly comparable.111 Not sur-
prisingly, the percentage of the two-party vote that the Democratic 
candidate received in a state in the previous presidential election is 
the biggest predictor of that state’s vote share in the current elec-
tion.112 This relationship indicates that voting outcomes in states 
tend not to vary too much from election-to-election. State presiden-
tial approval and state economic conditions show the next largest 
relationships.113 Substantively, these relationships suggest that if a 
state went from the lowest to the highest approval rating, we would 
expect about a 22% shift in Democratic vote share (+/- about 2.5%). 
The magnitude for a similar shift in economic conditions is about 
the same, but the uncertainty around this estimated relationship is 
much greater. Model fit is excellent, with about 90% of the variance 
in the dependent variable explained by the model.114 
 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id.; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, 
supra note 8, at 1–2. 
 113 See infra Figure 2. 
 114 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 




Figure 2: Estimated Relationship (and 95% Confidence Intervals) 
Between Forecast Model Variables and Percent Democratic Vote 
in Each State, 1980–2016. 
C. Forecast Accuracy, 2004–2016 
To generate our forecasts, we first estimate the relationship be-
tween the above variables and the percent of votes for the Demo-
cratic candidate (out of the votes received by each of the two major 
parties) in each state in prior elections.115 As described above, we 
then combine information from these relationships with data 
through July of election year to forecast the vote in each state.116 Our 
data begin in 1980, which is when the first election for which the 
 
 115 Id. at 1–2. Most election forecasts focus on two-party vote share because 
the winner of the two-party vote is what ultimately matters in a majoritarian sys-
tem, and this avoids the confounding effect of third parties. See HPR 2020 Presi-
dential Election Forecast, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://harvardpoli-
tics.com/hpr-2020-presidential-election-forecast/. The decision to focus on Dem-
ocratic vote share is arbitrary; the Republican vote share would produce identical 
conclusions. 
 116 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
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state-level index of coincident indicators data are available.117 Thus, 
our 2004 forecast was based on the model from 1980 through 2000 
and data through July 2004.118 Our 2008 forecast was based on a 
model using data from 1980 through 2004 and data through July 
2008.119 Using these model estimates that are based on previous 
elections and information on model variables available through July 
of election year, we forecast the election.120 Because all information 
is from before the election, we refer to these as “before-the-fact” 
forecasts.121 
In this section, we discuss our forecasts from 2004 through 2016. 
While our forecast model does well in all years,122 we are particu-
larly interested in the four most recent presidential elections because 
they include the elections that would be most influenced by social 
media campaigns and the new digital era.123 These years also ensure 
we have enough year-state data points from prior elections to make 
reliable and stable forecasts, and they allow us to compare our fore-
cast with other prominent forecasts of state-level presidential vote 
outcomes.124 
Figure 3 presents our before-the-fact forecast for each state (and 
Washington, D.C.) for each of these elections (y-axis) along with 
 
 117 Id. These data are first available in January 1979. Id.; Enns & Lagodny, 
Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3. Because we use a 
weighted cumulative average, having only 6 quarters of data for 1980 (instead of 
14) does not pose a problem (average for 1980 is based on 6 quarters instead of 
14). Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3 
(discussing full details on this economic measure). 
 118 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2, 
Online A-10–A-15. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 121 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4. 
 122 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1 (discussing earlier forecasts from our model). 
 123 See Garnett & James, supra note 3, at 112. 
 124 Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7–
A-8 (listing relevant comparison data); see Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 672 
tbl.3; Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 136; Forecasting the 2012 US 
Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy Model, 
supra note 74, at 666 tbl.3; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential 
Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 
74, at 683 tbl.2; Klarner, supra note 74, at 660 tbl.4. 
532 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:509 
 
the actual percentage of the two-party vote the candidate received in 
each state in each of these elections (x-axis).125 If we perfectly pre-
dicted each state’s vote share, all dots would align on top of the gray 
forty-five-degree diagonal line. While perfect predictions are, of 
course, implausible, the predictions follow the line quite closely in-
dicating a very high degree of accuracy. We predict the winner cor-
rectly in 94% of states during this period.126 
 
  
Figure 3: Before-the-fact Forecasts and Actual Vote Share, 
2004–2016. 
 
To get a more concrete sense of the accuracy of our forecasts, 
Figure 4 compares our forecasts with other prominent forecasts of 
 
 125 See infra Figure 3. 
 126 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
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U.S. state presidential votes.127 The left side of the figure compares 
the absolute mean error across states for each forecast of the 2012 
election.128 Our average error was the lowest across models and just 
over 2% in 2012.129 The bottom panel compares our 2016 before-
the-fact forecast with that of Bruno Jerôme and Véronique Jerôme-
Speziari (the other scholars did not report 2016 state forecasts).130 
Again, our model does quite well in a comparative sense.131 
 
 127 Infra Figure 4; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, 
at Online A-4, Online A-7; see Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 133–34; 
Forecasting the 2012 US Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State 
Political Economy Model, supra note 74, at 665–66 tbls.2–3; State-Level Fore-
casts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts 
Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682–85; Klarner, supra note 74, at 660–
61 tbl.4; Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 673 tbl.3. 
 128 Supra Figure 3. 
 129 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 3 tbl.2. 
 130 Supra Figure 3; see Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral Col-
lege Winner, supra note 8, at 1; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra 
note 47, at Online A-7–A-8; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential 
Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 
74, at 682–83. 
 131 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1, 3; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at 
Online A-7–A-8; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: 
Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682–
83. 





Figure 4:132 Absolute Mean Error of Our Model and Other  
State-Level Forecast Models in 2012 (top panel) and  
2016 (bottom panel).133 
 
 132 Values closer to the left indicate less error. 
 133 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 3 tbl.2. 
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Remember that our model only uses information available about 
100 days prior to the election.134 The most important variables in the 
model are the fundamentals (economic conditions and presidential 
approval) and how the state voted in the previous election.135 With 
these, and a few other variables (candidates’ state of residence, 
whether the state was part of the former Confederacy, and the per-
cent of the vote previously received in the state by prominent third-
party candidates), we are able to forecast each state’s vote with an 
average error of about +/- 2% in 2012 and about +/- 3% in 2016.136 
In a close election, 2 or 3% can obviously swing the outcome.137 But 
recall that we correctly predict the winner in 94% of the states in our 
analysis.138 Further, this appears to be the upper bound of potential 
influence. It is possible that if we added additional variables or data 
to our forecast model, we could improve the forecasts even more. 
Candidates, political parties, and organized interest groups 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars and vast amounts of time and 
energy on campaigns.139 Yet, the outcome of the election in each 
state—both in terms of who wins and the percent of votes re-
ceived—ends about where we would have expected before most of 
this took place. This continued to be the case in 2020. Based on data 
from 104 days before the 2020 election, our model correctly pre-
dicted every state outcome, except for one.140 
 
 134 Id. at 1. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online 
A-3–A-4. 
 137 See, e.g., Richard A Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical 
and Legal Analysis, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 138 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 139 See Brian Schwartz, The $10.8 Billion Election: 2020 Campaign Spending 
is Smashing Records, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:50 PM EDT), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/10/01/election-2020-campaign-spending-set-to-hit-record-
11-billion.html; Rebecca Jacobs & Walker Davis, Special Interest Groups Likely 
Spent More Than $13 Million at Trump Properties. They Got What They Paid 
For., CITIZENS FOR ETHICS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics.org/re-
ports-investigations/crew-investigations/special-interest-groups-spent-13-million
-trump-properties/. 
 140 Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, We Predicted the States Biden Would Win 
100 Days Before the Election, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:00 a.m. EST), 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING WHAT SWINGS THE 
VOTE: DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
A.  Our Methodology 
Popular media stories often imply that a candidate’s rhetorical 
missteps141 or behavioral subtleties like “wishful thinking” or “com-
placency” can swing the election outcome.142 However, if we truly 
want to understand what swings the vote, we must understand how 
much the vote can actually swing. We have argued that the potential 
for political campaigns, candidate debates, and traditional and new 
media to influence U.S. presidential elections is more limited than 
often thought.143 Our argument builds on the longstanding view in 
political science that national presidential election outcomes can be 
predicted with a high degree of accuracy based on a few fundamen-
tal variables, such as economic conditions and approval of incum-
bent presidents.144 
We extended this literature by presenting our state-level fore-
casting model to predict the Electoral College using only data avail-
able in June and July of the election year.145 Our mean error in 2012 
is about 2%, and in 2016, it was less than 3%.146 From 2004 to 2016, 
we accurately predict the winner of 94% of all states, and our fore-
cast was even more accurate in 2020.147 The main implication of 
these findings is that campaigning and media attention seem to con-
tribute surprisingly little to the overall outcome of elections since 




 141 See Bret Stephens, Biden’s Loose Lips Could Sink His Chances, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://nyti.ms/31olVrt. 
 142 George Packer, This Is How Biden Loses, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/how-biden-loses/615835/. 
 143 See supra Part I. 
 144 See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 123-24; Enns & Richman, 
supra note 21, at 815–17; Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419, 436. 
 145 Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 146 Id. at 3 tbl.2. 
 147 Id.; see Historical Presidential Elections, 270 TO WIN, https://
www.270towin.com/historical-presidential-elections/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 148 See supra Part I; see, e.g., STIMSON, supra note 5, at 93–95; ERIKSON & 
WLEZIEN, supra note 5, at 7. 
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millions of dollars spent on the campaign trail, vast social media 
campaigns, and micro-targeting matter some;149 however, we must 
remember that the fundamentals matter most, and there is relatively 
little vote shifting that results from the campaign.150 
In addition to helping understand the bounds or limits of cam-
paign effects, our forecast approach also offers a potential path for 
understanding how states’ policies and the law influence presiden-
tial elections. Specifically, we propose using the variation in the ac-
curacy of forecasts to evaluate the effect of state laws. 
B. Estimating the Effects of Disenfranchisement and Voter 
Registration Laws on Election Outcomes 
Almost six million individuals in the United States are disen-
franchised because they have been convicted of a felony.151 These 
disenfranchisement laws vary dramatically, however, both across 
states and over time.152 Vermont and Maine do not limit voting in 
any way for those convicted of a crime.153 There, everyone has the 
right to vote, even those currently in prison.154 Kentucky and Vir-
ginia law, by contrast, permanently disenfranchise anyone with a 
felony conviction.155 Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, 
 
 149 See supra Part I; see, e.g., OWEN, supra note 1, at 7, 11–12; Coppock et 
al., supra note 16, at 6–7. 
 150 See supra Part I. 
 151 See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL 
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3–4 (2016), https://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf; Fel-
ony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/vot-
ing-rights/voter-restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-map (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2021). 
 152 Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 In 2019, Kentucky Governor, Andy Beshear, signed Executive Order 
2019-003 Relating to the Restoration of Civil Rights for Convicted Felons, which 
restored voting rights to more than 140,000 Kentuckians who had completed their 
sentences for nonviolent felonies. See Ky. Exec. Order No. 2019-003 (Dec. 12, 
2019). in 2016, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an order that restored 
voting rights to Virginians with felony convictions, but this order was overturned 
by the Virginia Supreme Court in Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 724 (Va. 
2016). See Laura Vozzella, Virginia’s McAuliffe to Announce Restoration of 
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Tennessee, and Wyoming are slightly less strict, having eliminated 
voting rights for some felony convictions.156 Election forecasts 
might help explain how these laws influence election outcomes. 
Our state forecasts are generally quite accurate,157 but these fore-
casts do differ from the actual outcomes, and a handful of states dif-
fer by a fair amount (e.g., more than 5%).158 While numerous factors 
account for these forecast errors, prohibiting those who have been 
released from prison from voting may be an important potential fac-
tor. Recall that presidential approval ratings in each state are one of 
the most important predictors in our forecast model.159 These ap-
proval estimates come from nearly 90,000 randomly selected adults, 
reweighted to represent the demographic composition within each 
state.160 Thus, presidential approval corresponds to the entire (non-
institutionalized) adult population of each state, even though some 
states prohibit individuals from voting because of past felony con-
victions—even after they have served time in prison.161 As a result 
of this mismatch, we might expect larger forecast errors in states that 
have disenfranchised a greater proportion of the population.162 Fur-
ther, given the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans 
 
Voting Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginias-mcauliffe-to-announce-restora-
tion-of-voting-rights-to-13000-felons/2016/08/20/590b43ee-6652-11e6-96c0-
37533479f3f5_story.html. As a result, Governor McAuliffe announced that he 
would restore voting rights on an individual basis to those who had completed 
their sentences. See id.; Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151. 
 156 See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151. 
 157 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1–3. 
 158 Between 2004 and 2016, just twenty-three states (or 11% of all state fore-
casts) have a forecast error greater than 5% with the highest forecast error being 
Arkansas, just under 11% in 2008. 
 159  Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. For other state approval data, see Jeffrey M. Jones, Presidential Job 
Approval Related to Reelection Historically, GALLUP (May 29, 2020), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/311825/presidential-job-approval-related-reelection-his-
torically.aspx. 
 160  Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 161 See Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 1, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-
rights.aspx; Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151. 
 162 See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161. 
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who tend to lean strongly Democratic,163 we might expect to over-
predict Democratic support in these states because our presidential 
approval ratings include these individuals, who cannot vote. Ac-
cordingly, vote outcomes would not mirror projected Democratic 
support because of disenfranchisement laws.164 
The negative relationship between our southern state variable 
and Democratic vote share in Figure 2 may provide preliminary sup-
port for this hypothesis.165 We code the formerly Confederate states 
as “Southern,” which are among the most restrictive in terms of dis-
enfranchisement.166 It may be that part of the reason our model over-
estimates Democratic vote share in these states (as indicated by the 
negative relationship on this variable) is that those who are most 
likely to be disenfranchised by the criminal legal system are most 
likely to support Democratic candidates.167 To further test this hy-
pothesis, future research might add a variable to the forecast model 
to control for the portion of the state population that is ineligible to 
vote due to disenfranchisement laws. A decrease in forecast error 
when this variable is included in the model would provide evidence 
 
 163 See How Groups Voted in 2016, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RSCH., 
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/how-groups-voted-2016 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2021) (around 90% of African Americans typically vote for the Democratic pres-
idential candidate.); Peter K. Enns et al., What Percentage of Americans Have 
Ever Had a Family Member Incarcerated?: Evidence from the Family History of 
Incarceration Survey (FamHIS), 5 SOCIO. RSCH. FOR DYNAMIC WORLD 1, 5–6 
(2019); see also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3–4 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-
State-Prisons.pdf (discussing racial disparities in prison). 
 164 See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151. 
 165 See supra Figure 2. 
 166 See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161. Specifically, our Southern varia-
ble includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id.; Enns & 
Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4. All these states 
prohibit voting until after parole ends, which is considered part of the sentence. 
Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161; see also State Elections Legislation Data-
base, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/elections-and-campaigns/elections-legislation-database.aspx (provides an 
up-to-date database of election laws in fifty states). 
 167 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Con-
sequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 
777, 779 (2002). 
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of how disenfranchising those convicted of felonies influences pres-
idential election outcomes. 
Recent changes in state law and policy offer another analytic ap-
proach. For example, in November 2018, Floridians voted to restore 
voting rights of those convicted of felonies (except for murder or 
sexual offenses) after they completed all terms of their sentences, 
including parole or probation.168 Initially, up to 1.4 million Floridi-
ans were expected to gain the right to vote from Amendment 4.169 
However, the number able to vote in 2020 was closer to 800,000 
because Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and the Republican-con-
trolled legislature passed legislation to require that “all court-im-
posed fees, restitution and other financial obligations” be paid be-
fore those who regained their right to vote through Amendment 4 
can register to vote.170 
Although the exact number of new Floridians eligible to vote is 
less than originally thought after Amendment 4 passed, the number 
is still substantial.171 Most scholars argue that Florida’s permanent 
disenfranchisement of those who have committed a felony has been 
a pivotal factor in past elections,172 but there is some debate on that 
 
 168 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (amended 2018). 
 169 Id.; P.R. Lockhart, Florida Legislature Approves Bill Requiring Former 
Felons to Pay Fines and Fees Before Voting, VOX (May 3, 2019, 5:30 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/3/18528564/amendment-4-
florida-felon-voting-rights-fees; Florida Ex-Felons Can Begin Registering to 
Vote as Amendment Takes Effect, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-ex-felons-begin-registering-to-vote-as-
amendment-4-takes-effect/. 
 170 See Jeffrey Schweers, ‘New Beginning’ for Florida Felons: Registrations 
Continue Amid Voting Rights Fight, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2019, 
7:20 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/state/2019/11/21/flor-
ida-felons-still-registering-amidst-amendment-4-legal-battle/4223319002/. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See Amber Philips, How a Court Battle on Felon Voting Rights in Florida 
Could Affect the 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2020, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/19/florida-felon-voting-
rights-explained/; Coulter Jones & Jon Kamp, In 2020 Election, Florida Felon 
Voting Limits Could Sway State Outcome, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020, 8:03 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-2020-election-florida-felon-voting-limits-could-
sway-state-outcome-11601467381; see also Uggen & Manza, supra note 167, at 
786, 792 (“[T]he survey data suggest that Democratic candidates would have re-
ceived about 7 of every 10 votes cast by the felons and ex-felons in 15 of the back 
15 Senate Election years.”). 
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point.173 Our forecast model offers a direct method of estimating the 
effects of Amendment 4. Specifically, since those with felony con-
victions who have been released from prison have always been eli-
gible to participate in the surveys that estimate Floridians’ presiden-
tial approval,174 we would expect our forecast in Florida to become 
more accurate as more of these individuals become eligible to vote. 
Of course, there are other sources of forecast error that also vary 
from year-to-year, such as uncertainty around economic conditions 
(recall that state economic conditions are also in our forecast 
model).175 However, all else equal, less forecast error in 2020 would 
be consistent with evidence of Amendment 4 influencing Florida’s 
presidential vote.176  
Similar analyses could be done in other states that have restored 
voting rights.177 For example, as noted above, while Virginia law 
still permanently prohibits those with a felony conviction from ever 
voting, Governors Terry McAuliffe and Ralph Northam have re-
stored approximately 200,000 voters through executive action.178 
Shifts in other laws related to voting, such as voter ID laws, whose 
effects are notoriously difficult to study,179 can also be studied by 
comparing the size of forecast errors over time. If changes in voter 
 
 173 See Traci Burch, Did Disenfranchisement Laws Help Elect President 
Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout Rates and Candidate Preferences of Flor-
ida’s Ex-Felons, 34 POL. BEHAV. 1, 24 (2012). 
 174 See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online 
A-2–A-4 (discussing variables within model). 
 175 Id. 
 176 See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online 
A-7–A-8; Andrew Quintana & Daniela Flamini, Guide to Florida’s 2020 General 
Election: What Will Be on the Ballot?, NBC MIA. (Oct. 9, 2020, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/politics/decision-2020/guide-to-floridas-2020-
general-election-what-will-be-on-the-ballot/2292377/. 
 177 Nolan D. McCaskill, Felons Have the Potential to Swing Close 2020 
Races, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/09/11/felon-votes-swing-2020-races-409495. 
 178 Margaret Barthel, Nearly 200,000 Formerly Incarcerated Virginians Have 
Their Voting Rights Back. Will They Use Them?, WAMU88.5 (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://wamu.org/story/19/11/05/nearly-200000-formerly-incarcerated-virgini-
ans-have-their-voting-rights-back-will-they-use-them/. 
 179 See Benjamin Highton, Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the 
United States, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2017); Justin Grimmer et al., 
Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. POL. 1045, 1045, 
1050–51 (2018). 
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ID laws have a disproportionate effect on turnout, we would expect 
our forecast errors to increase after the implementation of such a 
law, as certain groups are less likely to turn out in the subsequent 
elections, adding some bias to forecasts in those states.180 
Evaluating forecast errors across states and time allows a direct 
test of the aggregate effects of state laws that affect who votes.181 To 
facilitate these types of analyses, we have made all our forecast data 
publicly available.182 When scholars conduct these types of anal-
yses, several factors must be kept in mind. First, the proposed re-
search design to use forecasts can only identify aggregate effects: If 
re-enfranchising citizens or increased voter restrictions push the 
election outcome in one direction, but another factor pushes the vote 
in the opposite direction, the aggregate result will be offsetting and 
will appear like no effect—even though the effect was real.183 Sec-
ond, the effects of these laws could differ from election to election, 
which would complicate the proposed analysis.184 For example, the 
effects might differ depending on whether the election outcome was 
expected to be close.185 Third, scholars must remember that many 
unobserved factors influence forecast error.186 Thus, we propose that 
researchers evaluate whether a change in election-related law led to 
a vote outcome beyond what we would have expected based on the 
 
 180 Oppose Voted ID Legislation - Fact Sheet, ACLU (May 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/oppose-voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet. 
 181 See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online 
A-7–A-8; State Felon Voting Laws, BRITANNICA, https://felonvoting.pro-
con.org/state-felon-voting-laws/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (providing a fifty-
state survey of election laws relating to felons). 
 182 Enns & Lagodny, Replication Data, supra note 10. 
 183 See Jason D. Mycoff et al., The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Ag-
gregate and Individual Level Turnout 15 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Brennan Center for Justice). 
 184 See What Affects Voter Turnout Rates, FAIRVOTE, https://
www.fairvote.org/what_affects_voter_turnout_rates (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 185 See id. 
 186 See Marc Meredith & Neil Malhotra, Convenience Voting Can Affect Elec-
tion Outcomes, 10 ELECTION L.J. 227, 228 (2011); Johannas Tang Kristensen, 
Factor-Based Forecasting in the Presence of Outliers: Are Factors Better Se-
lected and Estimated by the Median Than by the Mean?, 18 STUD. NONLINEAR & 
ECONOMETRICS 309, 310, 330 (demonstrating that “outliers” are important to ac-
count for in factor-based forecasting). 
2021] USING ELECTION FORECASTS TO UNDERSTAND 543 
 
distribution of potential forecast outcomes in that particular state.187 
That is, researchers should seek to identify whether a shift in a 
state’s law corresponds with a statistically significant shift in fore-
cast error. States that did not have an election-related law change 
can be used as a placebo analysis because we would expect no cor-
responding divergence between forecasts and outcomes in states that 
did not have changes in election-related laws.188 
Importantly, even if future works find limited or no effects on 
election outcomes, there are still numerous reasons to challenge 
laws that disenfranchise citizens or limit voter turnout. First, as 
noted above, effects may be real but offset by other factors, or the 
effects may be moderated by the election context, such as how close 
the outcome is expected to be.189 Second, our proposed analysis fo-
cuses on U.S. presidential elections. It is possible, perhaps even 
likely, that effects are more pronounced in state-level and local elec-
tions. Third, even if election outcomes remain the same, there are 
legal and moral considerations for increasing access to vote.190 Fi-
nally, evidence suggests that re-enfranchising those who have been 
convicted of a felony carries social benefits, such as reduced recidi-
vism and positive economic outcomes.191 It is important to under-
stand how election-related laws influence election outcomes, but 
 
 187 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1. 
 188 See State Felon Voting Laws, supra note 181. 
 189 See What Affects Voter Turnout Rates, supra note 184. 
 190 See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, 17 NAT’L BLACK 
L. J. 222, 244 (2002); Ako Ufodike, U.S. Election Results May Suggest Ethics No 
Longer Matter . . . Just Like in Canada, CONVERSATION, https://theconversa-
tion.com/u-s-election-results-may-suggest-ethics-no-longer-matter-just-like-in-
canada-149248 (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); Judy Nadler & Miriam Schulman, 
Campaign Ethics, MARKKULA CTR. APPLIED ETHICS, https://www.scu.edu/gov-
ernment-ethics/resources/what-is-government-ethics/campaign-ethics/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2021); see also Ethics: Public Service is a Public Trust, CLC, 
https://campaignlegal.org/issues/ethics (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (acting as a 
“watchdog” and proposing that solutions for greater accountability at all level of 
government). 
 191 See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voice-
lessness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L.J. 407, 413–14 (2012); WASH. ECON. GRP., INC., ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
OF RESTORING THE ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE FOR FLORIDIANS WITH FELONY 
CONVICTIONS AS A RESULT OF PASSAGE OF AMENDMENT 4, at 1–2 (2018). 
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this is not the only criterion that should be used to evaluate these 
laws. 
CONCLUSION 
We have extended past work on the predictability of U.S. presi-
dential elections by presenting a forecast model of each state’s pres-
idential vote.192 The accuracy of these “before-the-fact” forecasts 
offer several insights into U.S. elections.193 First, the accuracy of 
forecasts helps establish an upper bound for the potential of cam-
paigns, traditional media, and even social media to influence elec-
tion outcomes.194 Our average state forecast error was between 2 and 
3%, suggesting that the potential to swing the vote is quite lim-
ited.195 Our 2020 forecast correctly predicted the winner in all but 
one state.196 That being said, recent U.S. presidential elections have 
seen a few thousand votes in specific states (as in 2016) or even a 
few hundred votes in one state (as in 2000) determine the final out-
come.197 In these types of elections, almost anything can tip the final 
outcome. 
However, even when elections are this close,198 we have shown 
how forecasts offer an additional analytic tool for estimating the ef-
fects of election-related laws, such as legal or policy changes relat-
ing to enfranchising those who have been convicted of felonies or 
laws increasing restrictions on voter ID requirements.199 While 
 
 192 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 1–4. 
 193 See id. at 1. 
 194 See supra Part I. 
 195 See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, su-
pra note 8, at 3 tbl.2. 
 196 See Enns & Lagodny, supra note 140. 
 197 David Catanese, The 10 Closest States in the 2016 Election, U.S. NEWS 
(Nov. 14, 2019, 4:39 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-run-2016/arti-
cles/2016-11-14/the-10-closest-states-in-the-2016-election; November 7, 2000 
General Election Official Results: President of the United States, FLA. DEP’T OF 
STATE: DIV. OF ELECTIONS, https://results.elections.myflorida.com/SummaryRpt.
asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2000&Race=PRE&DATAMODE= (last visited Jan. 24, 
2021). 
 198 See Catanese, supra note 197; November 7, 2000 General Election Official 
Results: President of the United States, supra note 197. 
 199 See supra Part III.A. 
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estimating these effects are notoriously difficult, we believe fore-
casts offer an additional analytic strategy. Thus, we have made our 




 200 Enns & Lagodny, Replication Data, supra note 10. 
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